Most of us believe by now that a market economy will
outperform a planned economy hands down.
Communist states just fall behind in supplying material goods. And that's where we measure success in
the East-West competition, isn't it, in material satisfaction of the
workers? The American Dream is a
dream of money, ability to buy things; the Marxist dream is a dream of
satisfied needs, material needs (it's dialectical materialism, isn't it?).
Show Krushchev those rows of middle-class houses in Detroit, tell him
they belong to workers, and we can see points going up on the board.
So why did we need to do all those dirty tricks to
communist countries, and send advisers to coach resisters, and agents to funnel
arms to opponents, and technicians to help the arms-handlers, and do all those
covert things Robert M. Gates, Cold War insider, tells about in his book, From the Shadows?
"Because sometimes, when something had to be
done, you could do it more effectively and safely covertly than you could by
doing it in the open."
But why did we have to go so far? Like mining a
harbor and blowing up a Soviet ship.
Real in-your-face challenges.
I remember those Cold War anxieties. We knew what kind of eager warriors we had in
Washington. Smart, but oh my. They
could so easily miscalculate.
Trigger too much pride, impose too much humiliation, underestimate a
paranoia, and we could find ourselves under an approaching missile. Or stuck in a postcolonial swamp. Along with the dictator we backed.
"I know the answer to why we went so far. Because I've studied some history. It's that if we hadn't gone far enough
we simply would have lost."
Lost what?
Our lives? Our way of life?
"No.
The game. It's the game,
stupid. The Great Game, the game
played by Britain against Russia for a hundred years in Asia, the game played
by Palmerston in his morning coat and Disraeli in his spats, sending an
emissary here, a regiment there, the game we're continuing to play against
Russia now. But it's really the
game played by any country that wants to be a Great Power (to take over the
capital letters awarded to those countries who succeeded in the nineteenth
century). Slip a little and you lose
your title."
That's a tough game, I know, but if you're up
against communists you don't have to play it. If what my high-school civics teacher told me about both
systems is true we can just sit back and wait for their system to wither.
"Yes.
If your civics teacher is right about communist systems that's what our
legislators can vote for.
And if voters really believe what they say about communism, they'll be
behind them. So instead of a Cold
War with all its expense and crises we'll have peace and prosperity and saved
lives and built-up capital and everything civilized human beings might want. Oh
yes, and love will be a thing that can never go wrong, and (to finish Dorothy
Parker's way) you'll be Marie of Romania.
The unreality of your logically sound conclusion must be apparent to
you. "
Well,
with Gates’ help it's becoming so.
I must admit that it's hard to see any of those five presidents he
worked under — Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush — saying, "Well, we're
going to sit back and wait for things to go our way on this one." Even harder when you see Obama getting
plastered every time he goes an extra second on his chair.
"And that's just pressure from the voters. Think of presidential cabinets and
staffs, the best and the brightest, the most eager. Even the most progressive, those most alert to human
suffering, with the most humane instincts, even they are going to want
action. Action. Get a picture of them at home during
the Cold War (as in Katherine Graham's autobiography) and what do you see? Hawks, hawks, and more hawks. Democratic, humane,
Goldwater-deploring, Nixon-fighting, future warriors on poverty. There they are in Graham's dining room,
sorting out moves against the Soviets.
To the last guest!"
And yet, if my teacher is right about communism and
I'm right about a passive stand-down in the face of it, what they're going
against is peace and prosperity and saved lives and built-up capital and
everything civilized human beings might want. Who goes against such things? Barbarians. Are
Cold Warriors barbarians?
"It's a reasonable question, and, as you can
see in Gates' book, one our presidents most frequently had to ask about CIA
people, who often took the operational lead, or stood nearby pushing their
favorite operations. But pushed in
such a gentlemanly way. None more
gentlemanly, more civilized appearing, than CIA Director William J. Casey, "He dressed expensively and
formally. Even on weekends, when
he would come into the office, he almost always wore a jacket and tie."
He'd have been right at home, sartorially, among the players of the first Great
Game, those in the Palmerston cabinet, planning moves against the
Russians.
"And he'd have a lot in common with that other
group of well-dressed males around a table in St. Petersburg, planning opposing
moves. I'm with you here. They're all one. They're all having the time of their lives. 'Man, is this ever a great game.' All their hormones are engaged. Male
life lived all the way up. If the
Brits weren't having so much fun why would they call it a game?"
That's a terrible thing to picture when you can see
where the low-level players of their game wound up. There they are, the poet
reminds us, "East and west on fields forgotten....Lovely lads and dead and
rotten." To the soldiers it
wasn't such a great game.
"That eats at me me. And all the more in the light of the history I've read. I know that what put those lads on
those fields, dead, were moves planned by gentlemen, educated, highly civilized
gentlemen, England's brightest and best.
As our brightest and best put our lads, dead, on the fields of Viet
Nam."
It eats at me too. And it leads me to believe that I, for all my upward-gazing
awe, and you, for all your sophistication in history, still have a naive view
of gentlemen. All those players of
the Great Game, old and new, whatever their dress, or manners, or education, or
state of civilization, were playing for a very primitive satisfaction: to get
the best of another male. What we have to see in those morning coats,
essentially, is what I saw on my big city grammar-school playground:
competitors in a contest over who would be "cock of the walk," as my
uncle from the farm called the winner.
Unsatisfied testosterone.
New on the playground, old in the cabinet meeting. Inside that morning coat or blazer
there's still an unspayed tomcat.
There may be signs of a successful operation, but it hasn't worked.
"That's certainly hard for me to dispute when I
look at the CIA described in all the other books about it. Oh, it's got variety, and thought, and
humanity, but you know what its default position is? You really want to know? It's a grip on the balls. The CIA's most vigorous people, the people that gravitate to
it, still love Teddy Roosevelt, his manliness, his realistic manliness: 'When you've got 'em by the balls their hearts
and minds will follow.' So shut
up, peaceniks, about hearts and minds.
On with the Great Game. The
Ur-Game was Greek wrestling, with no holds barred."
How it must grind those types now when they read of
Jimmy Carter, that wimp, doing more with his talk of human rights to break down
the Soviet Union than they ever did.
Carter, leveraging the idealistic language Ford had gotten the Soviets
to agree to in the Helsinki Accords, and with the help of the new pope (still
with no army divisions), started the fires in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the
rest of Eastern Europe that would burn down the whole communist house. And Gates, noting how he and Ford were
belittled for their naive idealism by "those who considered themselves as
hardheaded realists in foreign policy," gives him full credit for it
(pages 89-96).
Did Carter understand power, the power of ideas,
their appeal to hearts and minds, better than they did? His behavior encourages doubt but to me
it looks like it. The central fact
about those CIA realpoliticians, those confident justifiers of the dirty trick,
the talking point when you want to take their money (and their reputation in
history) away, is that they simply did not
understand power.
"And, you know, every time a dirty trick was
exposed they had a chance to understand it. The indignation before the world's TV sets, the
disappointment in our allies' faces, the regret in the hearts of our young.
They could have learned something from that."
Well, they certainly got their come-uppance from the
grieving young in the sixties.
"Covert action? That
might be uncovered? Christ, can't
do that any more. Not with all
these students ready to flood the streets."
"The realpoliticians couldn't do anything any
more. Kissinger at the table with the North Vietnamese starts one of his old
moves and then, in mid-gesture, realizes that the students wouldn't put up with
it."
Ah, those sickened hearts and minds of the
young. But back to the education
of the vigorous old. Only if they
had taken their high-school civics course — the course the grieving young were
so much closer to — only if they had taken that course seriously, would they
have learned something. Take
"democracy" and "the rule of law" as mere words and you're
uneducable. You're free, in your
ignorance, to mine another nation's harbors, and overthrow its elected
presidents, and deceive your own legislators about the whole thing. You're free to undermine, and dismiss
as naive, the very power that can win the battle you're fighting, the power of
an idea.
So, I conclude, my high-school civics teacher had
the secret to power, the key to the kingdom, all along. She have could given it to these
presidents play by play. I'll make
her National Security Adviser and let her speak: "Trust your system. Trust democracy.
Trust free enterprise.
Trust the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Trust their strength.
In the battle for hearts and minds, the battle where the war is won,
they will win out. The world will
see you conserving lives and treasure, prospering, confirming the practicality
of your nation's ideals. And
there's only one person who can keep those ideals from winning out. You. You can screw them up. If by your behavior and the behavior
you allow your subordinates you show that you don't trust them, you will screw them up. The world will hear the once-powerful
words and say, 'Yeah, yeah.' There
goes your strength and you'll be back to the no-holds-barred game, which you
have no better chance of winning than the other dirty players have."
I'm with you on Jimmy Carter. Every time I hear the line that he has distinguished himself as an ex-president, I respond by counting the ways his foreign policy leadership as president enhanced the world.
ReplyDeleteWell, this hard guy Gates certainly respects him. Another guy he goes for is the first Bush, and I'm sure I'm with him on that.
ReplyDelete