I have never had an English
Composition student who wrote a piece — no, left my office with a piece — as
bad as the one by Heidegger's student, Hannah Arendt, writing in 1969 at the
height of her reputation as a political theorist and philosopher. You can see it now, in abbreviated
form, in the current (July 11) New York
Review, which is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary by reprinting
significant articles from the past.
Just look at how she opens an
important section of her essay, the philosophical section:
What makes man is
his faculty to act. It enables him to get together with his peers, to act in
concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises which would never enter his
mind, let alone the desires of his heart, had he not been given this gift — to
embark on something new.
Think about that "faculty to act." It's what distinguishes you as a human
being. Have you ever thought of
that before? "Jeez, I can act. I'm a human being."
Maybe the reason you haven't
thought of it before is that it's so hard for you to think of yourself as not being able to act. Of any living creature not being able
to act. Maybe, if you're a
chemistry major, of anything not
being able to act.
"Hell," I hear from the back of the room, "salt acts on
iron. Makes rust. Isn't that an action?"
So here is a writer — unless she's
picked out her words with a dart — making a big, special philosophical deal out
of something ordinary people can't see as special at all. How can it be special when everything
but a motionless blob of inert chemicals qualifies?
If a reader doesn't see that right
away, in the first sentence, if he thinks that triviality in common meaning
will play out into deep philosophical significance rather than come back and
bite you, he'll see it in the second.
But at greater cost. If
he's not a dull reader (not to be confused with the common reader) it will take
him about three seconds to see that this wonderful faculty also lets him do a
hundred million other, very different, things — like get together with his
inferiors, act out of concert with them, reject goals and enterprises,
frustrate desires, and embark on something old. Unless he catches on to Arendt as a ponderous declarer of
the obvious in the second item in the series (act in concert without, duh, the
ability to act?) our reader is going to waste twice as much effort, and feel
twice as much pain, as he would have if he'd twigged in after the first
sentence.
In an English Comp essay the more
pain you cause your reader, the more of his time you waste, the more laughter
you provoke in him, the lower your grade is. By those standards Arendt's essay gets the lowest grade in
the class. She must not have come
to my office. Oh no, of course
not. She went to Heidegger's
office. Why didn't the very first
sentence in the essay reveal that to me?
Or at least the first three sentences:
Violence, being instrumental by
nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end
which must justify it. And since
when we act we never know with any amount of certainty the eventual consequences
of what we are doing, violence can remain rational only if it pursues
short-term goals. Violence does
not promote causes, it promotes neither History nor Revolution....
Forget that by "violence" she has to mean
"the use of violence" (which can
be rational or irrational), and just note that she tells us it's
"instrumental by nature."
Not the usual "by its very
nature," but still delivering the intrinsic. Eliminating the observable. My student and I see Lou Piniella over there throwing the
furniture around in his office. We
think he's just expressing himself after a tough loss on the diamond but we've
been told to be quiet. You can't
argue with deductions from the very nature of a thing. He must have an end in view.
If you know the intrinsic you can
speak in absolutes: "We never know with any amount of certainty the
eventual consequences of what we are doing." Any amount of
certainty. So when my student
tells me that he's pretty sure Piniella, who had gone further and thrown second
base into center field, was going to be fined, I'd have to say, "Sorry,
you still can't argue. The nature
of human beings does not allow them to have the slightest idea that such a
thing will happen."
Writers who talk like that,
writers who think you have to believe it because they're telling you, writers
who speak like lords, writers who dismiss observation, writers who make it
impossible to argue, those writers never make it out of some professors'
offices. Arendt would never have
made it out of Professor R. M. Hare's office. Hare is the Oxford professor who famously explained to a New Yorker reporter what gave British
philosophers their advantage over continental (mainly German and French)
philosophers: "Here you read a thing to your tutor and he says to you,
'What do you mean by that?' and then you
have to tell him." You
sit there until you can make it clear.
Then you can turn in your essay.
Hare's office
was in England and my office was in Ohio but both of us, I think, were trying
to recreate Socrates' office in ancient Athens. Both American teachers of composition and British teachers
of philosophy set the same restriction:
nobody gets out (or sits in, for that matter) without explaining
himself. In other words, "You
enter here you're taking part in a dialogue." In both countries that would be understood to be a
democratic dialogue.
Now on the
continent it was, by all reports, entirely different. The signs read, "You enter here you're listening to an
authority." Different
philosophical traditions, different educations. Students learn to speak authoritatively. That is, if they don't watch
themselves, they learn to speak like lords.
Composition
teachers in America are paid to watch students, in case they can't watch
themselves. Speak like a lord in
your essay and you'd better not turn it in. The prof will wonder how you ever got out of his
office. If he reads a lordly essay
he asks, "What office did this
student come out of?" If he
reads Hannah Arendt's essay now, though, after he's learned some history and
read philosophers like Hare, he doesn't have to ask. Though a student could have learned (and still can learn)
lordliness in any number of offices in Europe, only in Heidegger's could one
have learned a lordliness like this.
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