Error philosophy
is what a teacher of English Composition develops after he discovers that truth
philosophy is no use to him. Aspiring
truth philosophers, graduate students, ask, "How does one reach the
highest truth?" Compelled
error philosophers (graduate students forced to teach freshmen) ask, "How
does one climb out of the deepest error?"
You want an example of the deepest
error? There's one in the latest
(11-21-13) New York Review. Mark Lilla, writing about the response
of postwar German youth to their parents' conformism, observes that "when
left-wing radicalism was at its violent peak in the 1970s the following false
syllogism became common wisdom: Nazi crimes were made possible by blind
obedience to orders and social convention; therefore anyone who still obeys
rules and follows convention is complicit with Nazism, while anyone who rebels
against them strikes a retrospective blow against Hitler" (page 36).
Here's another example. Albert Camus, in The Myth of Sisyphus, finds that reason is "impotent" in
the face of a "meaningless" universe. He concludes that reason is impotent in the face of anything
in the universe. It's all or nothing. (Je veux que tout me soit expliqué ou rien.) We recognize the common wisdom of
the agonized adolescent.
I call that mistake in syllogistic
reasoning deep error not because it's down disturbing the theoretical fundament
but because it's so hard to dig out.
It's down there in human nature, deep
in human nature. Something in our
genome (or in what fallen Adam passed on to us) says to German youth, "If
a thing is bad everything associated with it is bad. If you're good you'll believe this."
In America we sometimes fix, or
locate, this error in freshman nature, but that's wrong. Graduate students, when the political
fight gets warm enough, can commit as many informal fallacies as anybody. "Be logical," I heard a cool
one say to a warm one in 1974.
"Logical?" said the warm one. "Nixon was logical."
What makes it so hard to dig this
error out is that students, the best students, want to be deep. They arrive shallow, or thinking
themselves shallow, Midwest shallow, and the sooner they get deep the better. They don't know what's deep but they
think profs know. "So who do
the profs here think is deep?" It's not always Plato or Wittgenstein or
Nietzsche or John Rawls. In the
1960s in English departments it was Albert Camus, as evidenced by the number of
profs who repeated his fallacies.
Have we forgotten? "Reason and language, man's tools
for discovering the meaning of his existence and describing his world, are
useless." The absurdist
credo, repeated again and again in commentary on books like Catch-22. (The above is in Frederick Kiley and Walter McDonald, A 'Catch-22' Casebook, p. 255) Repeating the old, deep, elementary
errors.
In a semester you don't have time to
dig these errors out. You just
chip away at them. With the
absurdist credo, for example, you would try to get the writer to recognize the
equivocation (one of the informal fallacies) in the word
"meaning." Most of the
time "meaning" means "signification" (as "means"
does right there!) but some of the time it means "purpose." "I mean to be a 'saint,'
meaning one canonized by the church." There are both
meanings, properly distinguished, in the same sentence.
But look at that professor's statement
of the absurdist credo: "Reason and language, man's tools for discovering
the meaning of his existence and describing his world, are useless." Does Jean Kennard's word
"meaning" mean "signification" or "purpose"? If it means "signification" then "of his
existence" makes no sense but "describing his world" does; if it means "purpose" then it's the other way round.
The writer has "reason and language," willy-nilly, doing both,
giving him (and Jerry Rubin, and Abbie Hoffman, and about a hundred thousand
Yippies) a false syllogism that looks like a deep European justification for
the trashing of reason.
It would be easier to blame stupid
Americans if the equivocation hadn't started with all-or-nothing Camus. "Look, Reason, if you can't show
me the purpose of my existence don't come around trying to explain the street
outside." (Note: If British philosophers weren't so
reluctant to get personal they'd have had Camus' case analyzed in an instant:
he's been deprived of God, the traditional giver of meaning (purpose) to man's
existence, and is having a hard time getting used to it. When he matures in his atheism he will,
as Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer — those old hands at Godlessness — can tell
him, be less excited and more careful.)
The patron error philosopher is
Florence Nightingale, who, though she had a hard time saying just what a
hospital was or should be, knew one thing about it: that it shouldn't be a
place that spreads disease. That's starting at the small end. And from that start she went a long
way. If there had been a Jean-Paul
Sartre in her day, or teachers in awe of Jean-Paul Sartre, or any awe in her of
such teachers, she'd have never gotten on the road. "Before there can be any truth whatsoever there must be
an absolute truth" (Existentialism,
p. 43). Awesome.
From the point of view of an
English Composition teacher a European philosopher, then and now, is a regular
Typhoid Mary, spreading writing disease from ward to ward. Forget about philosophy, I say. That's upstairs. This is low level: making sense. With meaningful words. If you don't know what I'm talking
about read Post #209, on the infected Hannah Arendt, whose prose was hailed
(then and recently, in their memorial issue) by New York Review editors, themselves looking a little green around
the gills.
So what philosophy will you get
when you send students, aspirants, up to it sick? A lot of French and German postwar philosophy, that's what
you'll get. Don't be surprised if
there's an Anglophone quarantine.
What will surprise you is not that the quarantine was broken but that
the breakthrough came in English departments, the very departments where
disciples of Nightingale struggled, carrying lamps through the night. I wish I could explain it. I was there. But it's the biggest mystery of my 42-year career, how we
could pound away on the principles of good writing in one room and then walk
across the hall and teach (and write respectful articles about) authors who
contradicted those principles right and left, not only in their writing but in
their theory, their philosophy. Go
figure.
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