All right, the man who gives me the most penetrating insight
into the student riots of the sixties, T. E. Hulme, is associated with the
fascists of the Action Francaise. Obviously he can't be trusted. Fascists are
bad and he's bad. Do I have moral clarity?
No, you have moral facility. You have a litmus test that
makes good-bad judgment easy. Thousands before you have applied it. It's the
Nazis' gift to moral debate in the twentieth century.
And delivered, I see, by the logic of association (see Post
#66), not real logic. A passing cloud. But still, enough to make me go back and
check the essay. I see that Hulme's insight stands on its own merits. I'll use
it.
Yes, you're the boss, as a man seeking moral clarity has to
be.
Thank you. Now I can present you with a real problem. I'd
been doing all this marching, real and symbolic, behind the out-of-Viet-Nam
banners. The march had changed somewhat, the students were crazier and the
banners weren't quite the same ("national crime" had been changed to
"national stupidity," but I'd kept marching. Then I thought about
what I was saying, what the words on the banner meant. "Get out of Viet
Nam." Was that what I really
wanted us to do? No. I really wanted us never to have gotten in. That
stupidity. But, just as a military analyst, I had to admit that there was a
world of difference between getting out and not getting in. Once you're in you
face a host of new choices, and you'd better not make them without doing your
staff work. Retreat in the face of hostile fire has always been difficult for
generals, justification of retreat to the public has always been difficult for
politicians, (admit failure? cut and run?) and reconciliation with the
conscience difficult for individual citizens (our promises to our allies? our
responsibility for countries we've messed up?). It's all extremely complicated.
And there I was, saying simply, "Get out, get out." I was one with
all the knee-jerk sloganeers who got us in. So what do I do? Go home?
The problem is clear, but I don't know the solution. It's
the problem of complexity, made worse here by the fact that, as I remember,
there weren't any other marches in town. Here we may be facing one of those
problems that are just beyond our powers.
But I've named the problem, "complexity," I don't
know the half of it. Consider this, suggested by a friend: what I was seeing on
campuses wasn't close to what I was calling it, a political revolution. It was
a social revolution. Of course it didn't live up to my expectations. The social
and political were all mixed up. It was about as complex a situation as a
moralist can imagine.
I can believe that, but I don't think "complexity"
is the right name for what my friend described. Putting a social revolution on top of a political revolution
obscures the picture but it doesn't keep a determined moralist from clearing it
up. In a political revolution, for example, the agents have aims. In a social
revolution the agents just do things in a way that satisfies them more and
sociologists call the result a revolution. Seeing differences like that — and
there are a lot of them — is difficult but it can be done. The problem is
obscurity.
And obviously I can't give up on it. But I think I've now
gone as far as I can go so I think I'll let it alone for a while.
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