Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts

Saturday, August 9, 2014

254. The Hawk in Us, the Dove in Us.

 
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Men are 76% hawk and 24% dove.  Women are 68% dove and 32% hawk.  Seventy-five years of watching human beings consider war have given me those figures.

My mother gave me an explanation of the difference: "If men had to give birth they wouldn't be so quick to kill each other."

"Hawk" and "dove" have no permanent value.  Sometimes you want the hawk in man's nature to kick in and sometimes the dove.  It all depends on what analysis of the always-complicated particulars has shown.

If the analysis comes out with a "can't win" or "can't win without prohibitive cost" or "can't win without shame," you want to release your dove enzyme.  You are a citizen in a democracy and, since war or peace will depend on the number of individual enzyme triumphs, your squirt, one way or the other, is going to count.

Can enzyme squirts be controlled?  Enough to matter, I think.  We control that enzyme that makes us lust, whatever it is.  We put off looking at dirty pictures.  We, if we are in the priesthood, take cold showers.  When it's the hawk enzyme we're trying to stay on top of we can avoid looking at displays of atrocities, newsreels full of goose-steppers, leaders' faces made to suggest Stalin or Hitler.  Those are dirty pictures.

If analysis goes the other way, go ahead and look.  You'll need that testosterone.  Your country's leaders will need it.  Say we're attacked.  "Release the testosterone!" says the President, coming out of a cabinet meeting, and his people go to work on the pictures.  In a good cause.  Properly done.  We all do our best to control the dove enzyme.

No enzyme release, dove or hawk, is proper without analysis.  What The Economist released with its editorial on Putin's vices (along with putting his grey face in a web on its cover, that dirty picture) is improper.  Putin's vices, internally practiced, are no more appropriate in an analysis of international power than the Pope's virtues.  The question is, How many divisions does he have?  And where?

And the answers here are (1), "more than enough to take over the Ukraine any time he wants to" and (2) "right there on the border, or nearby" — in any case, a lot nearer than any we can muster.  Russian military forces have come a long way since 1993, when Yeltsin settled on an internally focused National Guard of about 100,000.

If that doesn't tighten your ducts there remain the nuclear weapons.  In November, 2012, "the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia has approximately 1,499 deployed strategic warheads, and another 1,022 nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads."

So put away those dirty pictures, Economist.  Take a cold shower.  You can do it.  Determined Christians, Christians brought up reading Dante and Milton, have done it for centuries.  It's called "reason governing the passions."

Would you like to have an example of a man governing his passions in our day, and in the face of these very temptations?  Malcolm Fraser, former prime minister of Australia, provides it in a piece he wrote for the Guardian on March 2, advising everybody to quiet down over Russia's incursion into Crimea.

Nobody can say Fraser lacks balls.  He's the Secretary of the Army who, against rising cries, managed and stuck to the program to conscript Australian youth and send them to fight in Viet Nam.  He's the Minister of Defence who brought a government down because the prime minister was interfering with his work.

So he was sitting on top of something when Putin threatened to intervene in Ukraine. And he kept on top of it long enough to consider why Putin was threatening.  A big reason was that he thought that the U.S. had promised his predecessor, Gorbachev, that if Russia agreed to the joining of then-communist East Germany to West Germany, and make it part of the West (membership in NATO), then NATO (the West) would not "move one foot East" — into "an area of traditional Russian influence."

Fraser counts on us to fill in his hints for the main reason that Russia is concerned about its sphere of influence.  It's not that it presides over an evil empire that it longs to see grow; it's that twice it's been invaded so appallingly from the West, first by Napoleon, then by Hitler.  We Americans easily blow away sphere-of-influence thinking as obsolete in a globalized family of nations, but we live safely with oceans all around us.  As does this Australian, Fraser.

But Fraser is analyzing now, and trying to see a problem "from the other fellow's point of view" (as the principal of my elementary school put his advice to us playground fighters).  That effort leads him to see NATO, which many thought "had done its job," move eastward "to the borders of Russia."  Right where Napoleon and Hitler had started from.

Fraser concludes that the move east "was provocative, unwise and a very clear signal to Russia: we are not willing to make you a co-operative partner in the management of European or world affairs; we will exercise the power available to us and you will have to put up with it."

In other words, playground belligerence.  That "belligerence" is the right word we confirm when we see President Bush trying to put elements of the anti-ballistic missile system into Poland and the Czech Republic, claiming that they're aimed at Iran. What other word would we use if Russia tried to put missiles into Nicaragua?  (Fraser didn't ask that; a little of my own enzyme is getting mixed in here.)

Even without my additions, though, Fraser makes a strong enough case to get a good dove surge, and it might have been even stronger if he had ignored the close studies showing that the U. S. did not, in fact, make that promise to Gorbachev. Enough people believe he did, enough to give him the necessary surge.  But no, he admits that Gorbachev "almost certainly" was mistaken.  And there goes Fraser's chance to produce an orgasm for peace, and get the big credit.  But so be it.  An analysis that comes out 75-25, rather than 90-10, still calls for the right enzyme.

What an exciting fallback Fraser makes!  It makes me so glad I chose him as my example of a man governing his passions in our day. Reason, demanding fairness and accuracy, was clearly in control.





Thursday, March 20, 2014

244. How to Strengthen a Scofflaw, Crony-Feeding Autocrat


Say his people have a strong sense of the motherland, which, unlike yours, has been deeply invaded twice from the west, devastating the country and mowing down its people.  Say that some time after repelling the last invasion the people saw some provinces of the country break away, and one province take with it a small part of the motherland that, for administrative convenience, had been transferred to it from another province.  Say this part of the motherland had been particularly fought over, so that the people could see a lot of their blood on its ground.

Say the ruler of this country is a scofflaw, crony-feeding autocrat representing an old, objectionable political system, and that a lot of his citizens still find it objectionable.  So his position as leader is not perfectly secure.  What could you as an outsider do to strengthen his position?

Well, obviously, you've got to threaten the motherland so that he can play "guardian of his people."  Nothing plants a ruler in power more firmly.  But you can't do that just bang.  This place is far away and a lot has to have been done earlier to get close.

Say that you're lucky and that that has been done.  Your alliance, NATO, instead of breaking up when this country broke up, and was no longer the threat that NATO was formed to meet, did not break up but stayed together and continued to press.  And your predecessors in office were happy to see it press, and pressed it to press, because so many of their countrymen were pressing them to press.  (I don't know why they did this.  It seems crazy.  Was it habit?  Was it inattention?  Or did they just not know how to behave unless they had an enemy?  I mean, they'd had a really evil enemy, and then a pretty evil enemy, and then people they could plausibly call evil, all those years, and there was all this great equipment ready to use against evil enemies.  How were they going to live without an enemy?)

Anyway, your predecessors put missiles in a country very close to this motherland, and then one of them wanted to press NATO right up to the borders of the now reduced nation.  You know what that's going to do to those people with a motherland sense.  They know that NATO membership means that these nations next to them have the United States ready to go to war, obliged by treaty to go to war, for them.  They, besides feeling ignored, or taken lightly, or affronted, lovers of the motherland are going to feel endangered and be very much on edge.

OK, you've got your chance, but first you are going to have to make some preliminary moves yourself.  The ruler of this reduced country makes some gestures of cooperation, even friendship.  He goes along with what you want to do to secure yourself against Iran and, to help you retract your over-extended neck in the Syrian conflict, offers to mediate.  You've got to keep seeing these as enemy moves.  "Russia tries again to insert itself into the Middle East."  That will shut up the re-set supporters in Russia.

Now you can set your tyrant in concrete, with a marble statue to follow.   He moves to take back the part of the motherland that, with the lost province, will go over to his people's old enemies.  I mean, they think that way too.  So you (or your secretary of state) huff, puff, complain, and threaten in all the old terms, so that the tyrant can (as Putin just did, NYT 3-19-14) quote you and discredit you by showing your hypocrisy (since you have tolerated the same thing in your friends) but most of all by showing your continuing presence as a threat.

As for his big speeches, you've practically written them for him.  "Our country is cornered" (applause), "they cheated us again and again" (applause), "if you press a spring too far it will recoil" (thunderous applause), "Crimea has always been a part of Russia" (standing ovation),  "after a long, hard and exhaustive journey at sea, Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to their home harbor, to the native shores, to the home port, to Russia!"  (chants of "Russia!  Russia!").  Tears of joy, tears of approval, tears of gratitude to the guardian of the Russian people.  You couldn't lock a scofflaw, crony-feeding autocrat in office more securely.

Monday, March 3, 2014

241. Ukraine: Sam, You Made the Pants Just Right.




 
How do we tailor our response to Russia's intervention in the Ukraine?  Sam Tanenhaus, in Sunday's NYT (3 1-14), says we should follow the pattern handed down to us by Cold War presidents, who, resisting the calls for tough, forceful action, trimmed and stretched and made accommodations. 
 
Eisenhower, preferring stability to confrontation, stood by while the Soviets sent tanks into Hungary, Kennedy pulled our missiles out of Turkey in exchange for Khrushchev’s calling his back from Cuba, Nixon agreed to cut our stockpile of nuclear weapons in exchange for the Soviets' cutting theirs, and even Ronald Reagan, the great hawk hero, came to the aid of Poland's Solidarity heroes only with words, money, and equipment.

"The Cold War," Tanenhaus reminds us, "was defined from the outset less by outright confrontation than by caution," a caution that came with "adjustment, compromise, improvisation and at times retreat."  He also reminds us that it was marked by denunciations of the cautious as  "weak-willed," "soft," and "naive."

Calling any of those presidents "naive" (as just yesterday I heard somebody on Fox call President Obama for his caution) is about as double-edged a charge as you're likely to hear.  What held Eisenhower back in the case of Hungary and held Reagan back in the case of Poland was an unalterable reality: proximity to Russia and distance from us.  The world's largest standing army, the one that defeated Hitler (yes, it could have done it by itself), was right there; the smaller forces that Representative John W.  McCormack wanted to call on were, for the most part, way over here, on this side of a big ocean.  And he said the Eisenhower administration was living in "a dream world."

If McCormack and his like had in mind the use, not of our comparatively small number of soldiers but of our large number of atomic weapons, they still don't look very realistic.  To avoid "emboldening" the Russians you're going to let fly the atom bombs and start World War III?  That possibility doesn't require some caution?

OK, so what's the first thing you do in an international crisis with the Russians?  As I read Sam Tanenhaus it's simple: tune out Fox network.  Then (I would add) get down to the realities and imagine how our actions might look from their side.  What do we expect from people who, regardless of their form of government then and now, suffered 50-60 million casualties because they didn't make sure that nations on their borders were friendly to them?

What has to be fitted into this reality is our promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights.  It's a tough fit.  That's why today's presidents should do what Tanenhaus says Cold War presidents did: adjust, compromise, and improvise.  You want pants you can wear?  Go to Tanenhaus.